[Wide-Open]

Re: What are atheists REALLY like?

I don't know how you people sleep at night.

Sister, given that they mostly wander around cemetaries at night probably means they never do.

[JennyD]

Re: What are atheists REALLY like?

Soft atheists (agnostic atheists) Think with some certain that there is no proven God(s) because of atleast what they see as circumstantial evidence; many different religions all claim to be true, "perhaps none are but maybe I am wrong".

Once again, that is the definition of agnostic.

You atheists are trying to pull agnostics in under your atheistic, God-hating umbrella of depravity.

Agnostics COULD be Saved(c), because they're just confused. They don't actively hate God like atheists. What do you do? Drag them down with you, trying to indoctrinate them into your perverse, anti-God "community". This is what you call "nice"?!

I don't know how you people sleep at night.

[SteveTheNiceAtheist]

Re: What are atheists REALLY like?

Hmm, would True Christians™ be Hard Theists then? I don't like the sound of that!


Please explain what Hard Agnostic Faith-Bound Atheists believe; I heard they don't get along with Soft Non-Agnostic Theists, or is that just an urban myth?

that is a good question. i dunno lol. is there hard thesm? beats me. lol. I think atheist want more than just the atheist umbrella terminology to feel somehow distinguished from other types of atheists. O.o

All i know is: a Hard Atheists (Hard Atheism) think they know there is no God(s). Dont ask me? i have know idea how they get there either.
Soft atheists (agnostic atheists) Think with some certain that there is no proven God(s) because of atleast what they see as circumstantial evidence; many different religions all claim to be true, "perhaps none are but maybe I am wrong".

[JennyD]

Re: What are atheists REALLY like?

I said a dictionary, not the lazy student's resource of unsubstantiated "knowledge".

[SteveTheNiceAtheist]

Re: What are atheists REALLY like?

There is no such thing as an "agnostic atheist". They are mutually-exclusive terms. Get a dictionary.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Agnostic atheism

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


Agnostic atheism, also called "Atheistic agnosticism", encompasses atheism and agnosticism. An agnostic atheist is atheistic because he or she does not believe in the existence of any deity and is also agnostic because he or she does not claim to have definitive knowledge that a deity does not exist. The agnostic atheist may be contrasted with the agnostic theist, who does believe that one or more deities exist but does not claim to have definitive knowledge of this.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"We are not here to please you, Agnostic Boy. We are on our private Christian Church forum, which you decided to join uninvited so you could insult God and us."

SteveTheNiceAtheist: I was not intending on insult you. I did not mean too. I figured Christmas has come and gone so christians would not be on the Offensive when it came to a matter such as faith. O.o I wanted to discuss religion with members of a faith. I find faith rather interesting. ~


"Meanwhile, Christian Love is not about making the Unsaved feel warm fuzzies before they go to Hell. It's about showing you God's Truth, so you come to Him before it is too late . . . even if we have to beat it into you.

We consider it love to point out to you that you're going to spend eternity in Hell. We think it's a good thing to tell you that you're headed for a disaster. I suppose agnostics think that's rude, and that it's "nice" to just send you on your way down the freeway knowing the bridge ahead is out?"

~k?

[Mrs. Rogers]

Re: What are atheists REALLY like?

~ agnostic theists = theists who say they dont know for sure and are willing to questiong their faith. (like Mike Huckabee)
~a non faith bound atheist = agnostic Atheist aka soft Atheist
~Millitant/Hard Atheists say "they know there is no god" but they do so partially on a kind of practical faith.

Hmm, would True Christians™ be Hard Theists then? I don't like the sound of that!

If one says they are agnostic they say I dont know, but that tells us nothing of what they believe to be true.

Please explain what Hard Agnostic Faith-Bound Atheists believe; I heard they don't get along with Soft Non-Agnostic Theists, or is that just an urban myth?

[JennyD]

Re: What are atheists REALLY like?

I thought Christians were nice. Giving infractions for "yappity yapp yap" doesn't seem very tolerant and not using "whom" in just the right way, ow. So I am an agnostic atheist, "lets kick his unholy butt" He doesn't believe. ~ agnostic theists = theists who say they dont know for sure and are willing to questiong their faith. (like Mike Huckabee)
~a non faith bound atheist = agnostic Atheist aka soft Atheist
~Millitant/Hard Atheists say "they know there is no god" but they do so partially on a kind of practical faith.
If one says they are agnostic they say I dont know, but that tells us nothing of what they believe to be true. One may not know, but believe there may be or may not be a God. So one could be just an "agnostic" yea, i understand that.

There is no such thing as an "agnostic atheist". They are mutually-exclusive terms. Get a dictionary.

We are not here to please you, Agnostic Boy. We are on our private Christian Church forum, which you decided to join uninvited so you could insult God and us.

Meanwhile, Christian Love is not about making the Unsaved feel warm fuzzies before they go to Hell. It's about showing you God's Truth, so you come to Him before it is too late . . . even if we have to beat it into you.

We consider it love to point out to you that you're going to spend eternity in Hell. We think it's a good thing to tell you that you're headed for a disaster. I suppose agnostics think that's rude, and that it's "nice" to just send you on your way down the freeway knowing the bridge ahead is out?

[SteveTheNiceAtheist]

Re: What are atheists REALLY like?

You are correct. I cannot possibly expect this person to grasp the argument with which I just confronted him. Why do I keep trying?

1. Either God exists or God does not exist, and you can either wager for God or wager against God. The utilities of the relevant possible outcomes are as follows, where f1, f2, and f3 are numbers whose values are not specified beyond the requirement that they be finite:
   God exists God does not exist Wager for God ∞ f1 Wager against God f2 f3
2. Rationality requires the probability that you assign to God existing to be positive, and not infinitesimal.
3. Rationality requires you to perform the act of maximum expected utility (when there is one).
4. Conclusion 1. Rationality requires you to wager for God.
5. Conclusion 2. You should wager for God. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~I am not unfamiliar with pascal wager roughly. How would this be used against polytheists though? (Separately)Or How would one get to any specific denomination of Christianity? Something which infuriates me about God (if God is like a Personal God ) That if I am a Good person all my life and I look at the religions of the worlds and say I dont know, I am going to hell (if a heaven/hell reality based of one of the abrahamic religions after death) for not feeling a specific belief.

I thought Christians were nice. Giving infractions for "yappity yapp yap" doesn't seem very tolerant and not using "whom" in just the right way, ow. So I am an agnostic atheist, "lets kick his unholy butt" He doesn't believe.
~ agnostic theists = theists who say they dont know for sure and are willing to questiong their faith. (like Mike Huckabee)
~a non faith bound atheist = agnostic Atheist aka soft Atheist
~Millitant/Hard Atheists say "they know there is no god" but they do so partially on a kind of practical faith.
If one says they are agnostic they say I dont know, but that tells us nothing of what they believe to be true. One may not know, but believe there may be or may not be a God. So one could be just an "agnostic" yea, i understand that.

[Pastor Al E Pistle]

Re: What are atheists REALLY like?

That makes you agnostic.

Period.

I have decided to give you an example of how to use "whom":

Q: To whom should I give an infraction for babbling ridiculously?
A: Why, to Steve!

You are correct. I cannot possibly expect this person to grasp the argument with which I just confronted him. Why do I keep trying?

[Wide-Open]

Re: What are atheists REALLY like?

uh~oh, well i think i might get in trouble by you guys for this one...
Agnostic atheist is an atheist who disbelieve all gods and religions because there is no evidence of any religion being proven especially more true than any other because of the inherit blind faith required by religion. Disproving that I know for certain something doesn't exists is nearly impossible, so based on the evidence I have I conclude that there is probably no correct religion or set of religious beliefs but I can not ever be fully certain that I know there is no God(s).

As Sister Jenny says: that's agnostic. An agnostic atheist is someone who's not sure atheists actually exist. Or someone who doesn't believe in agnostics.

Mind you, for The Lord it's the same difference: burn ye shall.

[JennyD]

Re: What are atheists REALLY like?

But it doesn't disprove it either.

PS: what's an agnostic atheist? Is that like a male female? "

uh~oh, well i think i might get in trouble by you guys for this one...
Agnostic atheist is an atheist who disbelieve all gods and religions because there is no evidence of any religion being proven especially more true than any other because of the inherit blind faith required by religion. Disproving that I know for certain something doesn't exists is nearly impossible, so based on the evidence I have I conclude that there is probably no correct religion or set of religious beliefs but I can not ever be fully certain that I know there is no God(s).

That makes you agnostic.

Period.

I have decided to give you an example of how to use "whom":

Q: To whom should I give an infraction for babbling ridiculously?
A: Why, to Steve!

[Pastor Al E Pistle]

Re: What are atheists REALLY like?

But it doesn't disprove it either.

PS: what's an agnostic atheist? Is that like a male female? "

uh~oh, well i think i might get in trouble by you guys for this one...
Agnostic atheist is an atheist who disbelieve all gods and religions because there is no evidence of any religion being proven especially more true than any other because of the inherit blind faith required by religion. Disproving that I know for certain something doesn't exists is nearly impossible, so based on the evidence I have I conclude that there is probably no correct religion or set of religious beliefs but I can not ever be fully certain that I know there is no God(s).

Good. Steve, if you can never be certain, why not familiarize yourself with Pascal's wager?


It is important to contrast Pascal's argument with various putative ‘proofs’ of the existence of God that had come before it. Anselm's ontological argument, Aquinas' ‘five ways’, Descartes' ontological and cosmological arguments, and so on, purport to give a priori demonstrations that God exists. Pascal is apparently unimpressed by such attempted justifications of theism: “Endeavour ... to convince yourself, not by increase of proofs of God...” Indeed, he concedes that “we do not know if He is ...”. Pascal's project, then, is radically different: he seeks to provide prudential reasons for believing in God. To put it crudely, we should wager that God exists because it is the best bet. Ryan 1994 finds precursors to this line of reasoning in the writings of Plato, Arnobius, Lactantius, and others; we might add Ghazali to his list — see Palacios 1920. But what is distinctive is Pascal's explicitly decision theoretic formulation of the reasoning. In fact, Hacking 1975 describes the Wager as “the first well-understood contribution to decision theory” (viii). Thus, we should pause briefly to review some of the basics of that theory.
In any decision problem, the way the world is, and what an agent does, together determine an outcome for the agent. We may assign utilities to such outcomes, numbers that represent the degree to which the agent values them. It is typical to present these numbers in a decision matrix, with the columns corresponding to the various relevant states of the world, and the rows corresponding to the various possible actions that the agent can perform.
In decisions under uncertainty, nothing more is given — in particular, the agent does not assign subjective probabilities to the states of the world. Still, sometimes rationality dictates a unique decision nonetheless. Consider, for example, a case that will be particularly relevant here. Suppose that you have two possible actions, A1 and A2, and the worst outcome associated with A1 is at least as good as the best outcome associated with A2; suppose also that in at least one state of the world, A1's outcome is strictly better than A2's. Let us say in that case that A1 superdominates A2. Then rationality surely requires you to perform A1.
In decisions under risk, the agent assigns subjective probabilities to the various states of the world. Assume that the states of the world are independent of what the agent does. A figure of merit called the expected utility, or the expectation of a given action can be calculated by a simple formula: for each state, multiply the utility that the action produces in that state by the state's probability; then, add these numbers. According to decision theory, rationality requires you to perform the action of maximum expected utility (if there is one).
Example. Suppose that the utility of money is linear in number of dollars: you value money at exactly its face value. Suppose that you have the option of paying a dollar to play a game in which there is an equal chance of returning nothing, and returning three dollars. The expectation of the game itself is

0*(1/2) + 3*(1/2) = 1.5,

so the expectation of paying a dollar for certain, then playing, is

-1 + 1.5 = 0.5.

This exceeds the expectation of not playing (namely 0), so you should play. On the other hand, if the game gave an equal chance of returning nothing, and returning two dollars, then its expectation would be:

0*(1/2) + 2*(1/2) = 1.

Then consistent with decision theory, you could either pay the dollar to play, or refuse to play, for either way your overall expectation would be 0.
Considerations such as these will play a crucial role in Pascal's arguments. It should be admitted that there are certain exegetical problems in presenting these arguments. Pascal never finished the Pensées, but rather left them in the form of notes of various sizes pinned together. Hacking 1972 describes the “Infinite—nothing” as consisting of “two pieces of paper covered on both sides by handwriting going in all directions, full of erasures, corrections, insertions, and afterthoughts” .This may explain why certain passages are notoriously difficult to interpret, as we will see. Furthermore, our formulation of the arguments in the parlance of modern Bayesian decision theory might appear somewhat anachronistic. For example, Pascal did not distinguish between what we would now call objective and subjective probability, although it is clear that it is the latter that is relevant to his arguments. To some extent, “Pascal's Wager” now has a life of its own, and our presentation of it here is perfectly standard. Still, we will closely follow Pascal's text, supporting our reading of his arguments as much as possible.
There is the further problem of dividing the Infinite-nothing into separate arguments. We will locate three arguments that each conclude that rationality requires you to wager for God, although they interleave in the text. Finally, there is some disagreement over just what “wagering for God” involves — is it believing in God, or merely trying to? We will conclude with a discussion of what Pascal meant by this.
The Argument from Superdominance

Pascal maintains that we are incapable of knowing whether God exists or not, yet we must “wager” one way or the other. Reason cannot settle which way we should incline, but a consideration of the relevant outcomes supposedly can. Here is the first key passage:

“God is, or He is not.” But to which side shall we incline? Reason can decide nothing here. There is an infinite chaos which separated us. A game is being played at the extremity of this infinite distance where heads or tails will turn up... Which will you choose then? Let us see. Since you must choose, let us see which interests you least. You have two things to lose, the true and the good; and two things to stake, your reason and your will, your knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to shun, error and misery. Your reason is no more shocked in choosing one rather than the other, since you must of necessity choose... But your happiness? Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is... If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, without hesitation that He is.

There are exegetical problems already here, partly because Pascal appears to contradict himself. He speaks of “the true” as something that you can “lose”, and “error” as something “to shun”. Yet he goes on to claim that if you lose the wager that God is, then “you lose nothing”. Surely in that case you “lose the true”, which is just to say that you have made an error. Pascal believes, of course, that the existence of God is “the true” — but that is not something that he can appeal to in this argument. Moreover, it is not because “you must of necessity choose” that “your reason is no more shocked in choosing one rather than the other”. Rather, by Pascal's own account, it is because “[r]eason can decide nothing here”. (If it could, then it might well be shocked — namely, if you chose in a way contrary to it.)
Following McClennen 1994, Pascal's argument seems to be best captured as presenting the following decision matrix:

God exists God does not exist Wager for God Gain all Status quo Wager against God Misery Status quo

Wagering for God superdominates wagering against God: the worst outcome associated with wagering for God (status quo) is at least as good as the best outcome associated with wagering against God (status quo); and if God exists, the result of wagering for God is strictly better that the result of wagering against God. (The fact that the result is much better does not matter yet.) Pascal draws the conclusion at this point that rationality requires you to wager for God.
Without any assumption about your probability assignment to God's existence, the argument is invalid. Rationality does not require you to wager for God if you assign probability 0 to God existing. And Pascal does not explicitly rule this possibility out until a later passage, when he assumes that you assign positive probability to God's existence; yet this argument is presented as if it is self-contained. His claim that “[r]eason can decide nothing here” may suggest that Pascal regards this as a decision under uncertainty, which is to assume that you do not assign probability at all to God's existence. If that is a further premise, then the argument is valid; but that premise contradicts his subsequent assumption that you assign positive probability. See McClennen for a reading of this argument as a decision under uncertainty.
Pascal appears to be aware of a further objection to this argument, for he immediately imagines an opponent replying:

“That is very fine. Yes, I must wager; but I may perhaps wager too much.”

The thought seems to be that if I wager for God, and God does not exist, then I really do lose something. In fact, Pascal himself speaks of staking something when one wagers for God, which presumably one loses if God does not exist. (We have already mentioned ‘the true’ as one such thing; Pascal also seems to regard one's worldly life as another.) In other words, the matrix is mistaken in presenting the two outcomes under ‘God does not exist’ as if they were the same, and we do not have a case of superdominance after all.
Pascal addresses this at once in his second argument, which we will discuss only briefly, as it can be thought of as just a prelude to the main argument.
The Argument From Expectation

He continues:

Let us see. Since there is an equal risk of gain and of loss, if you had only to gain two lives, instead of one, you might still wager. But if there were three lives to gain, you would have to play (since you are under the necessity of playing), and you would be imprudent, when you are forced to play, not to chance your life to gain three at a game where there is an equal risk of loss and gain. But there is an eternity of life and happiness.

His hypothetically speaking of “two lives” and “three lives” may strike one as odd. It is helpful to bear in mind Pascal's interest in gambling (which after all provided the initial motivation for his study of probability) and to take the gambling model quite seriously here. Indeed, the Wager is permeated with gambling metaphors: “game”, “stake”, “heads or tails”, “cards” and, of course, “wager”. Now, recall our calculation of the expectations of the two dollar and three dollar gambles. Pascal apparently assumes now that utility is linear in number of lives, that wagering for God costs “one life”, and then reasons analogously to the way we did! This is, as it were, a warm-up. Since wagering for God is rationally required even in the hypothetical case in which one of the prizes is three lives, then all the more it is rationally required in the actual case, in which one of the prizes is an eternity of life (salvation).
So Pascal has now made two striking assumptions:

(1) The probability of God's existence is 1/2.
(2) Wagering for God brings infinite reward if God exists.

Morris 1994 is sympathetic to (1), while Hacking 1972 finds it “a monstrous premiss”. It apparently derives from the classical interpretation of probability, according to which all possibilities are given equal weight. Of course, unless more is said, the interpretation yields implausible, and even contradictory results. (You have a one-in-a-million chance of winning the lottery; but either you win the lottery or you don't, so each of these possibilities has probability 1/2?!) Pascal's best argument for (1) is presumably that “[r]eason can decide nothing here”. (In the lottery ticket case, reason can decide something.) But it is not clear that complete ignorance should be modeled as sharp indifference. In any case, it is clear that there are people in Pascal's audience who do not assign probability 1/2 to God's existence. This argument, then, does not speak to them.
However, Pascal realizes that the value of 1/2 actually plays no real role in the argument, thanks to (2). This brings us to the third, and by far the most important, of his arguments.
The Argument From Generalized Expectations: “Pascal's Wager”

We continue the quotation.

But there is an eternity of life and happiness. And this being so, if there were an infinity of chances, of which one only would be for you, you would still be right in wagering one to win two, and you would act stupidly, being obliged to play, by refusing to stake one life against three at a game in which out of an infinity of chances there is one for you, if there were an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain. But there is here an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain, a chance of gain against a finite number of chances of loss, and what you stake is finite. It is all divided; wherever the infinite is and there is not an infinity of chances of loss against that of gain, there is no time to hesitate, you must give all...

Again this passage is difficult to understand completely. Pascal's talk of winning two, or three, lives is a little misleading. By his own decision theoretic lights, you would not act stupidly “by refusing to stake one life against three at a game in which out of an infinity of chances there is one for you”—in fact, you should not stake more than an infinitesimal amount in that case (an amount that is bigger than 0, but smaller than every positive real number). The point, rather, is that the prospective prize is “an infinity of an infinitely happy life”. In short, if God exists, then wagering for God results in infinite utility.
What about the utilities for the other possible outcomes? There is some dispute over the utility of “misery”. Hacking interprets this as “damnation”, and Pascal does later speak of “hell” as the outcome in this case. Martin 1983 among others assigns this a value of negative infinity. Sobel 1996, on the other hand, is one author who takes this value to be finite. There is some textual support for this reading: “The justice of God must be vast like His compassion. Now justice to the outcast is less vast … than mercy towards the elect”. As for the utilities of the outcomes associated with God's non-existence, Pascal tells us that “what you stake is finite”. This suggests that whatever these values are, they are finite.
Pascal's guiding insight is that the argument from expectation goes through equally well whatever your probability for God's existence is, provided that it is non-zero and finite (non-infinitesimal) — “a chance of gain against a finite number of chances of loss”.
With Pascal's assumptions about utilities and probabilities in place, he is now in a position to calculate the relevant expectations. He explains how the calculations should proceed:

... the uncertainty of the gain is proportioned to the certainty of the stake according to the proportion of the chances of gain and loss...

Let us now gather together all of these points into a single argument. We can think of Pascal's Wager as having three premises: the first concerns the decision matrix of rewards, the second concerns the probability that you should give to God's existence, and the third is a maxim about rational decision-making. Specifically:

1. Either God exists or God does not exist, and you can either wager for God or wager against God. The utilities of the relevant possible outcomes are as follows, where f1, f2, and f3 are numbers whose values are not specified beyond the requirement that they be finite:
   God exists God does not exist Wager for God ∞ f1 Wager against God f2 f3
2. Rationality requires the probability that you assign to God existing to be positive, and not infinitesimal.
3. Rationality requires you to perform the act of maximum expected utility (when there is one).
4. Conclusion 1. Rationality requires you to wager for God.
5. Conclusion 2. You should wager for God.

We have a decision under risk, with probabilities assigned to the relevant ways the world could be, and utilities assigned to the relevant outcomes. The first conclusion seems straightforwardly to follow from the usual calculations of expected utility (where p is your positive, non-infinitesimal probability for God's existence):

E(wager for God) = ∞*p + f1*(1 − p) = ∞

That is, your expected utility of belief in God is infinite — as Pascal puts it, “our proposition is of infinite force”. On the other hand, your expected utility of wagering against God is

E(wager against God) = f2*p + f3*(1 − p)

This is finite. By premise 3, rationality requires you to perform the act of maximum expected utility. Therefore, rationality requires you to wager for God.

[SteveTheNiceAtheist]

Re: What are atheists REALLY like?

But it doesn't disprove it either.

PS: what's an agnostic atheist? Is that like a male female? "

uh~oh, well i think i might get in trouble by you guys for this one...
Agnostic atheist is an atheist who disbelieve all gods and religions because there is no evidence of any religion being proven especially more true than any other because of the inherit blind faith required by religion. Disproving that I know for certain something doesn't exists is nearly impossible, so based on the evidence I have I conclude that there is probably no correct religion or set of religious beliefs but I can not ever be fully certain that I know there is no God(s).

[Pastor Al E Pistle]

Re: What are atheists REALLY like?

But it doesn't disprove it either.

PS: what's an agnostic atheist? Is that like a male female?

See Steve, now you have screwed up. You have got W-O after you. That's really not good.

[Wide-Open]

Re: What are atheists REALLY like?

To summarize my unintelligible mess above; Just because one atheist is a "jerk", and does not mean all are.

But it doesn't disprove it either.

PS: what's an agnostic atheist? Is that like a male female?